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I. INTRODUCTION 
Child support as a legal obligation has existed for decades.1  The 
principle underlying child support stems from the notion that parents’ 
financial obligation to their children should remain the same even if the 
parents’ relationship dissolves.2  The federal government mandated state 
acceptance of this principle when it required that states adopt guidelines and 
enforcement principles to ensure equal protection for children of non-intact 
families.3  The notable exception to this principle is parental contribution to 
higher education. 
Today, parents of intact families achieve extraordinary wealth transfer 
by providing higher education for their children.4  This transfer exists 
almost entirely outside of the traditional child support system.5  As a result, 
the equality principle on which child support is based fails to accommodate 
children of non-intact families in receiving higher education. 
The result proceeds in part from an arbitrary historical event—the 
lowering of the age of majority in response to a desire to enfranchise the 
troops fighting during the 1970s in the Vietnam War.6  Ironically, after the 
age of majority dropped, higher education was extended to a larger 
percentage of the population7 and the traditional family form changed, 
dramatically increasing the importance of child support.  Ultimately, the 
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 1. See Leslie J. Harris et al., Making and Breaking Connections Between Parents’ Duty to 
Support and Right to Control Their Children, 69 OR. L. REV. 689, 692 (1990). 
 2. Id. at 706–10 (analyzing various principles underlying child support, including the 
reciprocity between support duties, control rights, and the principle of parental autonomy). 
 3. See infra note 137–39 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra notes 49–54 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 49–54 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra section II.B. 
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results have been a wholesale extension of a child’s financial dependence 
into the early twenties, and for the children of non-intact families, the lack 
of support necessary to achieve higher education. 
To remedy this problem requires reversion to the basic principle 
underlying child support—an equality of support for children regardless of 
the parents’ marital status.  Today, higher education has surpassed the high 
school diploma as the pennant of educational necessity, and parents of 
intact families consistently provide their children with some level of 
support beyond high school.8  To preserve equality for children of non-
intact families, legislation is needed to mandate a parental obligation of 
support for higher education after the age of majority to capture the support 
that would have been realized had the relationship remained intact. 
Scholars have made the case for and against expanding child support 
obligations to cover post-minority and post-secondary9 education in several 
specific contexts.  Some have urged state legislatures to permit higher-
education support, while others have challenged post-minority support as 
unconstitutional.10  In response to these debates, some states have expanded 
child support, either directly or in the form of an educational trust, to cover 
higher education.11  Others, however, have consciously limited support 
                                                     
 8. See infra section II.B. 
 9. The term “post-secondary” is often used interchangeably with the term “post-minority” 
because the age of majority in most states is eighteen, the age when children are entering college.  In 
some states, however, where the age of majority is twenty-one for child support purposes, “post-
secondary” expenses are awarded within the child’s minority.  Whenever possible, and in attempt to 
eliminate any confusion, I will refer to “higher-education support” generally, unless the court or 
commentator uses a particular term. 
 10. Compare Carol R. Goforth, The Case for Expanding Child Support Obligations to Cover 
Post-Secondary Educational Expenses, 56 ARK. L. REV. 93, 95–97 (2003) (discussing the changes in 
the nature of secondary education and how those changes “create a powerful argument in favor of 
rules which encourage, and potentially require, parents to contribute to the post-secondary education 
of their children”) and Kathleen Conrey Horan, Postminority Support for College Education—A 
Legally Enforceable Obligation in Divorce Proceedings?, 20 FAM. L.Q. 589, 589 (1987) (focusing 
“on whether it is appropriate to carve out [an] . . . exception to the general rule of automatic 
emancipation for adult children who remain financially dependent by virtue of their status as college 
students”) with Judith G. McMullen, Father (or Mother) Knows Best: An Argument Against 
Including Post-Majority Educational Expenses in Court-Ordered Child Support, 34 IND. L. REV. 
343, 343 (2001) (concluding “that the law should not force divorced parents to contribute to the 
post-majority education of their children” because “parents of intact families can choose” whether to 
provide for college expenses) and Vincent A. Cirillo, Curtis v. Kline: The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court Declares Act 62 Unconstitutional—A Triumph for Equal Protection Law, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 
471, 471–73 (1996) (explaining how a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case declaring a statute 
requiring college child support unconstitutional “represents a victory for equal protection law”).  See 
generally Scott A. Hall, Note, In the Best Interests of the Child and the State: A Call for Expansion 
of Iowa’s Postsecondary Education Subsidy Law, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 235, 259–60 (2008) (arguing 
for an expansion of post-secondary education subsidy to apply to married parents). 
 11. See infra notes 75–89, 221–24 and accompanying text. 
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awards for education, providing less protection for children.12  Children 
should enjoy equal opportunity to receive support for higher education no 
matter the state in which they reside.  Indeed, there are definable segments 
of the population that have the financial resources to assist their children in 
receiving further education, but for psychological or other reasons, as more 
fully discussed below, they choose not to do so.  Rather than wait for state 
legislatures to act, if at all, I urge Congress to extend child support 
obligations to include higher-education expenses. 
Valuable empirical evidence highlights the unequal support of higher 
education for children of divorced families.  Judith Wallerstein, in a follow 
up to her decade-long study on the effects of divorce on children, reported 
that only twenty-nine percent of children from divorced families receive 
full or consistent-partial college support from one or both parents, 
compared to eighty-eight percent of those children from intact families.13  
Anecdotal evidence also indicates that children of divorce feel less 
protected economically than children in intact families.14  Even fathers with 
various professional degrees find child support to be the obligation that 
ends at the child’s majority, some stating “I paid my child support through 
the years.  I met all my obligations.  I’ve given my wife thousands of 
dollars, and now it’s up to her.”15 
Some parents lose concern for the children’s welfare because of 
perceived adverse custodial arrangements or because of animosity for the 
custodial parent and are determined to avoid any costs beyond the age of 
majority.16  Some parents, understandably so, resent the idea that they are 
excluded from participating in the decision-making process of higher 
                                                     
 12. See infra notes 70–74 (New Hampshire) and 152–57 (Pennsylvania) and accompanying 
text.  In 1997, the Colorado legislature repealed its law that allowed a court to order post-secondary 
education support without parental agreement.  For a discussion of the legislative changes in 
Colorado, see In re Marriage of Chalat, 112 P.3d 47, 50–51 (Colo. 2005).  In North Dakota, the 
legislature reacted to a court decision that required a father to pay expenses for his child’s college 
education by amending the law to make clear that support cannot extend past majority, unless the 
child is still in high school.  See Larson v. Larson, 694 N.W.2d 13, 16–18 (N.D. 2005) (comparing 
Donarski v. Donarski, 581 N.W.2d 130 (N.D. 1998) with N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2 (1999)). 
 13. JUDITH WALLERSTEIN ET AL., THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: A 25 YEAR 
LANDMARK STUDY 335–36 n.6 (2000).  Dr. Wallerstein followed sixty families with 131 children 
going through divorce.  Id. at 317.  She followed the families one, five, ten, fifteen, and twenty-five 
years after the divorce and learned a great deal about the long term consequences of divorce.  See id. 
at 247–50, 335–36 n.6; see also JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: 
MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 157–60 (1989). 
 14. See infra notes 181–86 and accompanying text. 
 15. WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 13, at 157–60. 
 16. Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 272 (Pa. 1995) (Montemuro, J., dissenting); see also William 
V. Fabricius et al., Divorced Parents’ Financial Support of Their Children’s College Expenses, 41 
FAM. CT. REV. 224, 236 (2003) (concluding that a dramatic factor in payment of college expenses is 
the legal custody arrangement of the child). 
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education, but are expected to pay the bill.17  Properly crafted legislation 
can address these concerns while ameliorating the negative effects on a 
child’s higher-education goals. 
This Article undertakes a systematic examination of extending the child 
support obligation to pay for higher-education expenses.  A starting point 
should be an amendment of federal child support legislation to add higher-
education expenses as a component of child support, which ultimately must 
be addressed by all states.  With guidance from states that have already 
mandated this level of support, a comprehensive discussion of the 
principles to draft effective state legislation will be examined.  First, in Part 
II, I will examine the laws that led to a decline in higher-education support 
and will track trends affecting the education of children today.  In Part III, I 
will conduct a comprehensive survey of uniform and state laws, both 
statutory and jurisprudential, that authorize support for higher-education 
expenses.  Part IV will develop my argument that congressional action is 
necessary and will address constitutional concerns of equal protection and 
other potential policy arguments that are counter to this proposal.  Finally, 
in Part V, I will conclude. 
II. PAYING FOR EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES 
A. Historical Perspective 
Parental support for higher education is inextricably intertwined with 
the legal age of majority.  Prior to 1970 and dating back to at least 1751, 
twenty-one was generally accepted as the age of legal majority in 
America.18  Historically, parents were required to provide “necessaries” 
to their children until they reached the age of majority or otherwise 
became emancipated.19  The earliest interpretation of “necessaries” came 
in the 1844 case of Middlebury College v. Chandler.20  Middlebury 
College sought payment for tuition, board, and other related educational 
expenses from a minor, who could bind himself and therefore his father 
                                                     
 17. See infra notes 191–94 and accompanying text. 
 18. Legal Memorandum, Nat’l Ass’n of Secondary Sch. Principals, The Changing Age of 
Majority (Jan. 1974).  The accepted age of majority “grew out of the Act of Parliament of the 
Province of Massachusetts Bay, which established 21 as the age for performing certain civic duties 
back in 1751.”  Id.  The majority age of twenty-one, however, dates back “even further in Anglo-
American legal history—at least to 1620 when the age for serving in the English Army had reached 
this level.”  Id. 
 19. Lindsay E. Cohen, Note, Daddy, Will You Buy Me a College Education? Children of 
Divorce and the Constitutional Implications of Noncustodial Parents Providing for Higher 
Education, 66 MO. L. REV. 187, 189 (2001). 
 20. 16 Vt. 683 (1844). 
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for the payment of necessaries.21  The Vermont Supreme Court 
concluded that although a “good common school education” was 
essential to one’s usefulness in society, a college education was not.22 
Nearly eighty-five years later, in the 1920s, two decisions framed the 
debate of whether a parent’s obligation of child support extended into 
college.  On the one hand, in Wynn v. Wynn,23 the Ohio Court of Appeals 
rejected the request of a twenty-year-old child to receive support for 
college from his father, reasoning that the law does not require a parent 
to send a minor to college, nor does it substitute the court’s judgment for 
that of the parent in deciding whether to send a minor child to college.24  
On the other hand, the Washington Supreme Court in Esteb v. Esteb25 
ordered a father to provide support for his daughter’s college education, 
finding that without a college education, a child would be severely 
restrained from pursuing most trades and professions because he would 
be forced to compete against people who possessed greater skills as a 
result of such higher education.26  The court rejected the Middlebury 
College analysis, finding its rule antiquated, and expressed that courts 
should progress with the changing educational needs of society.27 
The 1970s saw the greatest upheaval in parental support obligations 
due to the changing age of majority as a direct result of the Vietnam 
War.28  Eighteen-year-olds were being drafted and dying in Vietnam, but 
were unable to vote for the politicians deploying them overseas.29  In 
response to public outcry, Congress proposed and the states successfully 
ratified the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, lowering 
the legal voting age to eighteen.30 
Changes in the voting age, however, called into question the age of 
legal emancipation.  Consequently, in the early 1970s, most states 
reduced the legal age of majority to meet the legal voting age.31  This 
                                                     
 21. Id. at 685. 
 22. Id. at 686. 
 23. 6 Ohio Law Abs. 450 (Ohio Ct. App. 1928). 
 24. Id. at 451. 
 25. 244 P. 264 (Wash. 1926). 
 26. Id. at 267–68. 
 27. Id. at 267. 
 28. See Horan, supra note 10, at 590. 
 29. Id. 
 30. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1; see also Kenneth J. Guido, Jr., Student Voting and 
Residency Qualifications: The Aftermath of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 32, 
38–44 (1972) (providing a general discussion of Title III of the Voting Rights Act of 1970 and the 
Twenty-Sixth Amendment’s legislative history). 
 31. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 8.1, 
at 309 (2d ed. 1988); see also Horan, supra note 10, at 590.  Just prior to the amendment, “[i]n 1970, 
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change, as expected, had ramifications in family law.  States were 
promptly met with pressing challenges as to how the changes in the age 
of majority would affect support for children.32  Suddenly, some children 
were legally catapulted into majority, and child support was virtually 
eliminated for the college years.33 
At the time, there were no state statutes to deal with this new gap in 
family law.  Some courts denied support after the age of eighteen 
because they had no authority to enforce care of a child who had reached 
the age of majority.34  As a result, support ended for some children 
before the completion of high school.35  State legislatures reacted and 
today most states allow child support to continue past the age of eighteen 
for the limited purpose of permitting the child to graduate from high 
school.36  Now, almost forty years later, a growing trend toward higher 
education has resulted in college replacing high school as the educational 
norm, but without the legal obligation of support. 
B. Trends in Higher Education 
Although higher education was traditionally attainable only by an 
elite few, courts have recognized that “[w]here the college graduate . . . 
was [once] the exception, to-day such a person may almost be said to be 
the rule.”37  Indeed, a young adult who is unable to secure some form of 
higher education is “generally handicapped in pursuing most of the 
trades or professions of life.”38  Today, a high-school diploma can 
guarantee no more than a minimum-wage job.39  Although overall wages 
                                                                                                                       
Montana and Alaska reduced the age of majority to 19.”  Legal Memorandum, Nat’l Ass’n of 
Secondary Sch. Principals, supra note 18.  One year later, eight states lowered the age to eighteen.  
Id.  “In 1972, twenty more states reduced the age to 18, and two more to 19.”  Id.  In 1973, eleven 
states reduced the age of majority to 18, including Montana and Iowa, lowering it from 19.  Id.  Still, 
“[s]ome states have preferred to confer specific privileges upon youth at various ages rather than 
change the age of majority itself.”  Id. 
 32. Horan, supra note 10, at 590. 
 33. Id. at 590–91. 
 34. Id. at 591, 608; see also Shoaf v. Shoaf, 192 S.E.2d 299, 303 (N.C. 1972). 
 35. Horan, supra note 10, at 591. 
 36. McMullen, supra note 10, at 348 (citing LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY 
LAW 600 (2d ed. 2000)). 
 37. Esteb v. Esteb, 244 P. 264, 267 (Wash. 1926); see also Goforth, supra note 10, at 95 (“The 
very nature of education in this country has changed radically over time.”). 
 38. Esteb, 244 P. at 267. 
 39. See KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, NO SHAME IN MY GAME: THE WORKING POOR IN THE INNER 
CITY 43 (1999).  In this noteworthy study published in 1999, anthropologist Katherine S. Newman 
examined the lifestyles of 300 people who had graduated from high school, worked minimum wage 
jobs, and were still struggling due to lack of further education.  Id. at xvi.  One man she interviewed 
explained that “a basic education is almost obsolete,” and even with a high school diploma, “you 
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have been rising, wages for workers without a college degree have been 
declining.40  No scholar, court, or commentator has denied the value of 
post-secondary education. 
Statistics provided by the Department of Education obviate the need 
for higher education and the rising cost to meet those needs.  Increases in 
enrollment at degree-granting post-secondary institutions have ballooned 
eight times over the last fifty years and are projected to increase another 
eleven percent in the next ten years.41  The average annual cost per 
student at a four-year in-state public undergraduate institution, including 
tuition, room, and board in 2006 was approximately $12,797, up from 
$1935 in 1976.42  Without room and board, tuition alone increased from 
$617 in 1976 to $5666 in 2006.43 
Increased costs bring challenges to many families.  Students 
generally rely on financial aid, consisting of grants and loans, to attend a 
post-secondary school, but a gap still exists to cover the full cost of 
education.  The Department of Education refers to this gap as the “net 
access price,” which it defines as the estimate of the cash outlay that 
students and their families provide in a given year to cover tuition, fees, 
books, materials, and living expenses.44  During the 2003-2004 academic 
year, the net access price for a four-year public institution was $9300, or 
sixty-one percent of the total cost of attending the institution.45  While 
the government provides significant financial aid, students and their 
families—and often the custodial parent—shoulder the financial burden 
of higher education.  Fortunately, though, advanced education translates 
to increased earning power. 
“Completion of higher education today is unquestionably tied to 
financial stability and independence.  In fact, ‘few people would refute 
this causal relationship between higher educational attainment and 
                                                                                                                       
may as well stay at Burger Barn, ’cause that’s as far as you gonna go unless you get lucky and know 
somebody.”  Id. at 139. 
 40. Goforth, supra note 10, at 94. 
 41. THOMAS D. SNYDER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 
DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2008, 502–03, tbl. 331 (2009), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs 
2009/2009020.pdf.  In 1950, when the federal government entered the child support foray, 
approximately 2.2 million students were enrolled in degree-granting post-secondary institutions.  Id. at 
306, tbl. 188.  In 2006, the number grew to approximately 17.8 million students and is expected to 
increase to between 19 and 20 million students by 2017.  WILLIAM J. HUSSAR & TABITHA M. BAILEY, 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PROJECTIONS OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 
TO 2017, 53, tbl. 10 (36th ed. 2008), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2008/2008078.pdf. 
 42. SNYDER ET AL., supra note 41, at 503, tbl. 331. 
 43. Id. (for public in-state, four-year institutions). 
 44. MICHAEL PLANTY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE 
CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2007, 90 (2007), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/2007064.pdf. 
 45. Id. at 91. 
0.6.0_WALLACE FINAL 2/24/2010  12:53:06 PM 
672 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
earning power.’”46  To obtain a job capable of funding a middle class 
standard of living, technical training, trade school, college, and even 
post-graduate education are essential.47  According to the U.S. Census 
Bureau, “[a]dults with advanced degrees earn four times more than those 
with less than a high school diploma.”48  With the modern mainstream 
attending college, education has become an economic necessity. 
The growing importance of higher education was documented in a 
fascinating article by John Langbein entitled The Twentieth-Century 
Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission.49  Professor Langbein 
concluded that unlike in earlier times when parents would transfer wealth 
to their children at death in the form of property, today parents transfer 
wealth during life in the form of investment in education for the child or 
“human capital.”50  His thesis is supported by statistics that demonstrate 
the growing enrollment of higher education, the immense cost of 
education, and its long-term value.51 
Professor Langbein aptly noted, “[t]here is no mystery about who has 
been paying the bill for this vast expansion of education.”52  Although 
scholarships, loans, and student income account for some portion of 
these expenses, parents are the primary investors in their child’s 
education.53  He concludes, rather intuitively, that the dividends 
                                                     
 46. Michele M. Benedetto, The Key to Successful Independence: State-Funded Post-Secondary 
Educational Assistance for Emancipated Foster Youth, 23 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 383, 392 
(2008). 
 47. McMullen, supra note 10, at 345. 
 48. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, One-Third of Young Women Have Bachelor’s Degrees 
(Jan. 10, 2008), http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/education/011196.ht 
ml.  In 2006, the average American worker with less than a high-school diploma earned an average 
of $20,873.  Id.  After earning a high school diploma, earnings increased to $31,071; after attending 
some college, earnings increased to $34,650; after attaining a bachelor’s degree, earnings increased 
to $56,788; and after earning a master’s, professional, or doctoral degree, earnings increased to 
$82,320.  U.S. Census Bureau, Mean Earnings of Workers 18 Years and Over, by Educational 
Attainment, Race, Hispanic Origin, and Sex: 1975 to 2006, tbl. A-3 (2007), http://www.census.gov 
/population/socdemo/education/cps2007/tabA-3.xls. 
 49. John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 
MICH. L. REV. 722, 730 (1988). 
 50. Id. at 723. 
 51. In 1840, the overall cost for formal education in the United States was $9.2 million.  Id. at 
730.  This figure rose to $289.6 million in 1900 and had reached $23.9 billion by 1959.  Id.  Less 
than thirty years later, the amount had increased tenfold to $282.1 billion, which represented 7% of 
the gross national product.  Id.  In 1870, only 2% of the population graduated from high school, a 
figure that increased a century later to 75.6%.  Id. at 731.  Singling out college enrollments as a 
percentage of the college age population showed an increase from 12.5% in 1946 to 31.3% in 1985.  
Id.  The percentage of the American population that had completed four or more years of college 
study likewise increased from 4.6% in 1940 to nearly 20% in 1985.  Id. 
 52. Id. at 732. 
 53. Id. 
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associated with educated human capital will far outweigh the dollars that 
parents spend, and could ultimately have left, in the hands of their 
children.54 
The rewards of an education correlate not only to earning power, but 
to increases in productivity, declines in poverty, and greater income 
equality.  Society as a whole will benefit from a more educated society 
and, for those children whose higher-education potential has been 
negatively affected by their parents’ marital status, society, through its 
lawmakers, should step in.  Some states have already met the call for 
reform, and others should follow. 
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
Although no uniform provision exists concerning higher-education 
support, the American Law Institute Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution55 and the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act56 both 
contemplate educational support for college.  While some states have 
relied on these models to construct statutes addressing educational 
support, others have developed support provisions through case law. 
A. Uniform Laws 
The American Law Institute in section 3.12 of the Principles of the 
Law of Family Dissolution makes support for college and vocational 
training, which is termed an important “life opportunity,” dependent on 
both parental resources and the likelihood that such support would have 
been forthcoming had there been no divorce.57  The Institute envisioned 
that a child should not suffer the loss of “life opportunities” that the 
parents can provide without undue hardship.58  Recognizing that even 
highly-educated parents underinvest in the education of children who do 
not reside with them, the Institute fashioned a two-part test: first, a court 
should consider whether, based on objective criteria, the parent would 
                                                     
 54. Id. at 736. 
 55. The American Law Institute, through a careful deliberative process, publishes various 
Restatements of the Law, suggestions for model acts or reform, and Principles, which express the 
law as the Institute thinks it should be.  The Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis 
and Recommendations were considered from 1989 through 2002 and were then published in 2002.  
AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS XIII (2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]. 
 56. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 309, 9A U.L.A. 573 (1998). 
 57. PRINCIPLES, supra note 55, § 3.12(1)–(2). 
 58. Id. 
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have provided support if living with the child.59  Second, if higher-
education support was objectively reasonable, courts should be given 
discretion in calculating an amount that reflects the parents’ ability to 
pay.60  Although several states have adopted the principles embodied in 
section 3.12, none have adopted the verbiage. 
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act does not speak directly to 
college expenses, but it provides that parents owe a duty to a child “to 
pay an amount reasonable or necessary for his support” after considering 
five factors: “(1) the financial resources of the child; (2) the financial 
resources of the custodial parent; (3) the standard of living the child 
would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved; (4) the 
physical and emotional condition of the child and his educational needs; 
and (5) the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent.”61  
These factors are used by some states to award child support, without 
authorizing post-majority educational support,62 but can likewise extend 
to college expenses based, as it is for secondary education, on the 
financial resources of the parents.  The Uniform Act also envelops an 
expectation consideration—“the standard of living the child would have 
enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved.”63  Parents who would 
have expected to pay for college had the relationship remained intact 
should contribute to higher education should it dissolve. 
B. State Laws 
State laws, although not generally modeled on uniform acts, have 
contributed to an increase in higher-education support, with notable 
exceptions.  Currently, about one-third of states have either a statute or 
jurisprudence that specifically provides for higher-education support.64  
Some states that provide for educational support terminate child support 
at the age of twenty-one, thereby encompassing some post-secondary 
years.65  Only one state prohibits the award of post-minority educational 
support, even in light of the parties’ agreement at divorce to so provide.66  
                                                     
 59. Id. § 3.12 cmts. a–b. 
 60. Id. § 3.12 cmt. b. 
 61. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 309. 
 62. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-320(D) (Supp. 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-
10-115(2), (15)(b) (West Supp. 2009). 
 63. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 309(3). 
 64. See infra notes 75–89 and accompanying text. 
 65. See infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 66. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:14(V) (Supp. 2009) (support payments not authorized 
beyond high school); see also In re Goulart, 965 A.2d 1068, 1071 (N.H. 2009) (concluding that the 
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The majority of states, even though no post-minority support is 
authorized by statute, will honor the parties’ agreement to provide that 
support in a contract or in the divorce decree.67 
Overall, higher-education support can be seen on a continuum with 
Hawaii providing the most liberal support scheme and New Hampshire 
providing the most restrictive.  In Hawaii, a court can award support for 
an adult or minor child to pursue an education as long as the child is 
enrolled as a full-time student or has been accepted and plans to attend as 
a full-time student in a post high school university, college, or vocational 
school.68  No time limit is placed on that right.69 
In New Hampshire, however, the legislature statutorily prohibits 
higher-education support: “No child support order shall require a parent 
to contribute to an adult child’s college expenses or other educational 
expenses beyond the completion of high school.”70  In at least one case, 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court, based on the above quoted statute, 
refused to enforce a provision in a stipulated parenting plan that required 
the noncustodial father to contribute to the adult child’s college 
expenses.71  The facts of the case are particularly troublesome because in 
the parenting plan, the parties specifically recognized the limiting 
statutory provision and agreed, with the assistance of counsel, to provide 
support for college nevertheless.72  The court recognized the inequity but 
felt constrained by the legislation to deny support.73  Rather, it urged the 
legislature to rectify the problem.74 
Of the other states on the continuum that specifically authorize 
higher-education support, there are varying degrees of liberality.  
                                                                                                                       
statute deprives any state court of subject matter jurisdiction “to either approve or enforce a 
provision in a stipulated parenting plan that requires parents to contribute to their adult child’s 
college expenses”). 
 67. See infra note 121. 
 68. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 580-47(a) (West 2008) (providing that in the case of an adult 
child’s education, the state agency, three months prior to the adult child’s nineteenth birthday, must 
send notice to the child and the parent that prospective child support will be suspended unless proof 
is provided, prior to the child’s nineteenth birthday, that “the child is presently enrolled as a full-time 
student in school or has been accepted into and plans to attend as a full-time student for the next 
semester a post-high school university, college, or vocational school”). 
 69. See id.  In several sections, without limitations on age, educational support for adult 
children is specifically sanctioned.  Id. §§ 580-47, 584-15(e), 584-18(b). 
 70. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:14(V).  For a discussion of the history leading up to the 
legislative amendment, see Ryan C. Leonard, New Hampshire Got it Right: Statutes, Case Law and 
Related Issues Involving Post-Secondary Education Payments and Divorced Parents, 4 PIERCE L. 
REV. 505 (2006). 
 71. See In re Goulart, 965 A.2d at 1071. 
 72. Id. at 1069. 
 73. Id. at 1072. 
 74. Id. 
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Connecticut,75 Illinois,76 Indiana,77 Iowa,78 Massachusetts,79 Missouri,80 
New Jersey,81 New York,82 Oregon,83 Utah,84 and Washington85 have 
enacted statutes, and Alabama,86 the District of Columbia,87 
Mississippi,88 and South Carolina89 rely on precedent to permit higher-
education support. 
Overall, the financial resources of the parents and the child are 
central concerns for each state.  Additionally, the child’s commitment to 
and aptitude for higher education enters the analysis.  Notice of the intent 
to start school and disclosure of grade and course study are, in some 
states, important, and others consider the standard of living and 
expectation of the parties during the marriage to award educational 
support.  Because no uniform provision has emerged, a look at court 
considerations, the duties imposed on parents and children, and the 
limitations placed on educational support provide a backdrop for 
discussion. 
1. Court Considerations 
An introspective approach fuels the courts’ consideration of higher-
education support based in large part on the dependent relationship 
between a parent and child.  Embodied in the factors is the idea that 
financially competent parents should contribute to the cost of the child’s 
higher education, because if the relationship was intact, support for 
                                                     
 75. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56c (West 2009). 
 76. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/513 (West 2009). 
 77. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-14-11-18, 31-16-6-2 (West 2008). 
 78. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 598.1(8), 598.21F (West 2001 & Supp. 2009). 
 79. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 28 (West 2007). 
 80. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.340(5) (2000). 
 81. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 2009); see also Kiken v. Kiken, 694 A.2d 557, 
560–61 (N.J. 1997) (noting that the legislature “essentially approved” the criteria set forth in 
previous cases to guide courts in determining a separated parent’s obligation to provide support for a 
child’s post-secondary education). 
 82. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(c)(7) (McKinney 2008). 
 83. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.108 (West Supp. 2009). 
 84. UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-1 (West 2004). 
 85. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.19.090 (West 2005). 
 86. Ex parte Bayliss, 550 So. 2d 986, 994–95 (Ala. 1989). 
 87. Butler v. Butler, 496 A.2d 621, 622 (D.C. 1985). 
 88. Nichols v. Tedder, 547 So. 2d 766, 769 (Miss. 1989) (finding that parents may be ordered 
to pay additional amounts over and above child support for additional expenses such as a college 
education); see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-11-65 (West Supp. 2009) (support terminates at the age 
of 21). 
 89. Risinger v. Risinger, 253 S.E.2d 652, 652–53 (S.C. 1979); Lacke v. Lacke, 608 S.E.2d 147, 
149–51 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
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higher education in most cases would have continued until the child 
became self-sustaining. 
Although “all relevant factors” should be considered,90 when 
analyzing educational support specifically, courts are directed to focus on 
(1) the financial resources of both parents;91 (2) the financial resources 
and needs of the child;92 (3) the expectation of the parties had the 
marriage remained intact;93 and (4) the child’s academic prospects, 
desires, and aptitude.94 
In several states, courts are also directed to consider the educational 
background of the parents and how it affects the expectation of the 
child.95  Additionally, when considering the financial resources of the 
child, some states include income earned during the school year as well 
as financial aid awarded in the form of grants and loans.96  In South 
                                                     
 90. New York law is the most general, allowing courts to award support for post-secondary 
education with “regard for the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties and in the best 
interests of the child, and as justice requires . . . .”  N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(c)(7) (McKinney 
2008); see also Paccione v. Paccione, 870 N.Y.S.2d 430, 433 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (“[T]he court 
may direct a parent to contribute to a child’s education, even in the absence of special circumstances 
or a voluntary agreement of the parties . . . [and] must consider the circumstances of the case, the 
circumstances of the respective parties, the best interests of the children, and the requirements of 
justice.” (citations omitted)). 
 91. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56c(c)(1) (West 2009); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/513(b)(1) (West 2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-16-6-2(a)(1)(C) (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
598.21F(2) (West Supp. 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.19.090(2) (West 2005); Ex parte 
Bayliss, 550 So. 2d 986, 987 (Ala. 1989); Evans v. Evans, 994 So. 2d 765, 771 (Miss. 2008); 
Newburgh v. Arrigo, 443 A.2d 1031, 1038 (N.J. 1982); Risinger, 253 S.E.2d at 654. 
 92. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56c(c)(2); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/513(b)(3); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 31-16-6-2(a)(1)(B); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21F(2); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-
23(a)(1), (7) (West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.19.090(2); Bayliss, 550 So. 2d at 987; 
Newburgh, 443 A.2d at 1038–39. 
 93. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56c(c) (whether it is more likely than not that the parents 
would have provided support to the child had the marriage remained intact is a threshold question in 
Connecticut); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/513(b)(2) (“The standard of living the child would have 
enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved” is considered along with the other relevant factors 
listed.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.19.090(2) (the statute lists both “the expectations of the 
parties for their children when the parents were together” and specifically “the amount and type of 
support that the child would have been afforded if the parents had stayed together” as factors to 
consider); Bayliss, 550 So. 2d at 987 (“the standard of living that the child would have enjoyed if the 
marriage had not been dissolved” is considered after the first, second, and fourth considerations 
listed above); Newburgh, 443 A.2d at 1038 (“whether the parent, if still living with the child, would 
have contributed toward the cost of higher education” is the first factor listed). 
 94. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56c(c)(5); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/513(b)(4); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 31-16-6-2(a)(1)(A); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21F(2); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 26.19.090(2); Bayliss, 550 So. 2d at 987; Evans, 994 So. 2d at 771–72; Newburgh, 443 A.2d at 
1038; Risinger, 253 S.E.2d at 653. 
 95. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.19.090(2) (considering “the parents’ level of education”); 
Newburgh, 443 A.2d at 1038 (considering “the effect of the background, values and goals of the 
parent on the reasonableness of the expectation of the child for higher education”). 
 96. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56c(c)(3)–(4); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-16-6-2(a)(1)(B); IOWA 
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Carolina, the child is required to exhaust all grants and scholarships 
before receiving an award, unless the parents voluntarily assume the 
obligation in the divorce decree, in which case the child is not obligated 
to minimize his or her expenses.97  Finally, and often a dispositive 
consideration, a child must maintain a relationship with the parent, 
including being responsive to advice and guidance from the parent, for 
higher-education support to continue.98 
2. Duties of the Parents 
The parents’ primary duty is to pay the court-ordered award of 
support.  In some cases, both parents pay the child’s expenses in 
proportion to their incomes,99 while in others, the custodial parent—
when the child returns for the summer—is not required to pay any 
higher-education support.100  Some states set forth the expenses parents 
will be held accountable for, including room, board, tuition, 
transportation, books, fees, medical expenses, medical insurance, and 
living expenses.101  In Iowa, the cost of post-secondary education is 
limited to the cost of attending an in-state public institution, the award 
                                                                                                                       
CODE ANN. § 598.21F(2)(b); Newburgh, 443 A.2d at 1039. 
 97. Nicholson v. Nicholson, 663 S.E.2d 74, 82–83 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008).  If the parents’ 
agreement requires the child to minimize his or her expenses, the court will enforce that agreement.  
Id. 
 98. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21F(4) (stating that if the child has publicly disowned the parent or 
refused to acknowledge the parent, educational support will not be awarded); Bayliss, 550 So. 2d at 
987 (stating that the court may also consider the child’s relationship with his parents and 
responsiveness to parental advice); Norris v. Pethe, 833 N.E.2d 1024, 1033–35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) 
(concluding that a child’s refusal to participate in the parent-child relationship will obviate a parent’s 
obligation to pay college expenses); Hambrick v. Prestwood, 382 So. 2d 474, 477 (Miss. 1980) 
(considering whether the “behavior toward, and relationship with the [parents], makes the child 
worthy of the additional effort and financial burden” placed upon that parent); Newburgh, 443 A.2d 
at 1039 (stating that “the child’s relationship to the paying parent, including mutual affection and 
shared goals as well as responsiveness to parental advice and guidance,” is among the factors 
considered). 
 99. Jeff Atkinson, Support for a Child’s Post-Majority Education, 22 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 695, 
706–07 (1991); see, e.g., In re Marriage of Sreenan, 402 N.E.2d 348, 350–52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) 
(affirming the trial court’s holding that “ordered the husband to pay 65 percent of [the education] 
costs, the wife to pay 23 percent, and each daughter to pay 12 percent.”). 
 100. Atkinson, supra note 99, at 707; see, e.g., In re Marriage of Korte, 549 N.E.2d 906, 910–11 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (stating that “[w]hile the contribution of [the custodial parent] may not be 
capable of strict mathematical calculation, the trial judge could very well find . . . that, in equity, [the 
custodial parent’s] contributions are equivalent” to the dollar amount the other spouse was ordered to 
pay). 
 101. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56c(f) (providing that the expenses cannot be more than the 
amount charged by the state university for a full-time, in-state student unless the parents agree 
otherwise); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/513(a)(2) (West 2009) (providing for not only the school 
year, but also during periods of recess). 
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can include only “reasonable costs” for “necessary” expenses, and the 
amount paid by each parent cannot exceed thirty-three-and-one-third 
percent of the total cost of the post-secondary education.102  Legislation, 
in some instances, directs that the sums awarded should be payable to the 
child directly, to the parent, or to the educational institution itself.103 
3. Duties of the Child 
In exchange for parental support, children are required to provide 
notice to the parent of enrollment and achievements at various levels.104  
Some states require the child to notify the parent in advance of attending 
a post-secondary school.105  In Missouri, the child must be enrolled in an 
institution “not later than October first following graduation from a 
secondary school.”106  Once the child is enrolled in the academic or 
vocational school, many states require the student to remain in good 
academic standing as defined by the institution at the risk of automatic 
suspension of payments.107  In Connecticut, the child must pursue at least 
                                                     
 102. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21F(2)(a), (c).  Recognizing that a college education includes 
social, cultural, and educational experiences outside the classroom, Iowa courts reject limiting 
“necessary” expenses to tuition, room, board, and books.  In re Marriage of Vannausdle, 668 
N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 2003).  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Goodman, 690 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Iowa 
2004) (requiring cash allowances); In re Marriage of Steele, 502 N.W.2d 18, 20 (Iowa Ct. App. 
1993) (providing for transportation); In re Marriage of Hull, 491 N.W.2d 177, 178–79 (Iowa Ct. 
App. 1992) (same).  Additionally, any expenses that parents previously agreed to pay constitute 
“necessary” expenses.  See generally In re Goodman, 690 N.W.2d at 284 (sorority dues that parents 
agreed to pay); In re Marriage of Hankenson, 503 N.W.2d 431, 432 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (personal 
and clothing expenses as agreed to by the parent). 
 103. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56c(g) (stating that payments may also be directed 
“otherwise as the court determines to be appropriate”); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/513(a)(2) 
(stating that the funds can also be deposited into a special account or trust for the purpose of higher 
education); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21F(3) (stating that payments shall not be made to the custodial 
parent); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.19.090(6) (West 2005) (stating that the parents are directed to 
pay the educational institution directly if feasible). 
 104. Oregon has the most elaborate notification scheme.  The child must give written notice to 
the parent before the child’s eighteenth birthday, and if the child changes schools, the child must also 
send notice.  OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.108(6)(a)(A) (West Supp. 2009).  If the child is no longer 
attending school or if the child has failed to give the parents access to his academic performance, the 
parents must provide to the child written notice of their intent to stop paying, and after thirty days 
may stop paying. Id. § 107.108(8)(b). 
 105. HAW. REV. ANN. STAT. §§ 580-47(a), 584-18 (West 2008) (requiring notice to be given to 
the child support enforcement agency); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.108(6)(a)(A) (requiring notice to 
be given to the parents before the child reaches the age of eighteen). 
 106. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.340(5) (2000). 
 107. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56c(e) (stating that a child must maintain good academic 
standing pursuant to the rules of the institution); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21F(5) (stating that a child 
must maintain a cumulative grade point average in the median range); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.340(5) 
(stating that a child must attain grades sufficient for continued enrollment); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 26.19.090(3) (stating that a child must remain in good academic standing as defined by the 
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one-half of the course load determined by the school to constitute full-
time enrollment.108  Several states require the child to permit the 
supporting parent to have full access to the child’s academic transcripts 
and records.109 
4. Limitations 
States are not consistent on the age or event that terminates higher-
education support.  Three states permit a child to collect higher-
education support to the age of twenty-three,110 one state permits support 
to the age of twenty-two,111 and five states and the District of Columbia 
permit support to the age of twenty-one.112  Some states with and without 
age limitations also limit support to achieve an undergraduate degree 
only.113 
                                                                                                                       
institution). 
 108. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56c(e); see also MO. REV. STAT. § 452.340(5) (A “child 
who is employed at least fifteen hours per week during the semester may take as few as nine credit 
hours per semester and remain eligible for child support.”). 
 109. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56c(e); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/513(a)(2) (West 
2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21F(5) (requiring student to provide parent with transcript); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 452.340(5) (same); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.108(6)(a)(B); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 26.19.090(4). 
 110. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56c(a); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 28 (West 2007); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.19.090(5). 
 111. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.1(8) (2001). 
 112. D.C. CODE § 46-101 (2005) (age of majority is eighteen, with the exception of any 
common-law or statutory right to child support); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.340(5) (support for higher 
education to terminate at the age of twenty-one) (currently pre-filed in the Missouri Legislature is 
House Bill 1391 that would extend higher-education support until the age of twenty-two, which was 
the law in Missouri prior to a 2007 amendment that lowered the age to twenty-one); N.Y. FAM. CT. 
ACT § 413(1)(a), 413(1)(c)(7) (McKinney 2008) (child support, including post-secondary support, 
terminates at age twenty-one); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.108(1)(a)(B) (a “[c]hild attending 
school” for purposes of continued support must be under twenty-one years of age); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 15-2-1 (West 2004) (“courts in divorce actions may order support to age 21”); Butler v. 
Butler, 496 A.2d 621, 622 (D.C. 1985) (“notwithstanding other provisions of the D.C. Code making 
a person an adult at age 18, for purposes of child support, a person is considered a child until age 
21”); Crow v. Crow, 622 So. 2d 1226, 1230 (Miss. 1993) (absent an express agreement by the 
parents, a court has no authority to order support for college expenses beyond the age of majority, 
which in Mississippi is twenty-one). 
 113. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56c(a) (no educational support can be awarded beyond an 
undergraduate degree); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/513(a)(2) (terminating educational expenses 
“when the child receives a baccalaureate degree”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.1(8) (the subsidy is 
limited to an undergraduate education); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 28 (costs are not 
permitted beyond an undergraduate degree); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.340(5) (support continues until 
the child, meeting certain criteria, completes vocational or higher education or until the child reaches 
the age of twenty-one, whichever comes first); Risinger v. Risinger, 253 S.E.2d 652, 653 (S.C. 1979) 
(limiting the award to four years of college). 
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Not all states limit educational support by age or attainment of 
degree.  As noted above, Hawaii permits support to be paid to an adult 
child of any age and for an indefinite time.114  Indiana and Alabama 
permit higher-education support as ordered by the trial court, but without 
a specific temporal requirement.115  Finally, in New Jersey, emancipation 
is attained by the financial independence of the child, not a specific age, 
and support has been granted for post-graduate education.116 
Other limitations exist by state.  In Connecticut, if the original 
divorce decree fails to provide for the educational support of the child or 
to reserve the issue for consideration at a later date, an educational 
support order cannot thereafter be awarded.117  In Massachusetts, for the 
child to qualify for higher-education support, he or she must be 
domiciled in the parent’s home118 and dependent on the parent for 
maintenance while enrolled in an undergraduate program.119  Finally, in 
Iowa, post-secondary educational support is limited to children of 
divorce and does not apply to children of unmarried parents.120 
The majority of states fall toward the end of the continuum and will 
enforce higher-education support only when parents have agreed in a 
contract or in the divorce decree.121  While commendable, those 
                                                     
 114. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 580-47(a) (West 2008). 
 115. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-11-18(1) (West 2008) (support is permitted “until further order of 
the court”); Waddell v. Waddell, 904 So. 2d 1275, 1280–81 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (concluding that 
“the trial court must set reasonable limitations on the parent’s responsibility for postminority 
educational support,” and an award to last for a “reasonable period of time” lacks sufficient temporal 
certainty). 
 116. Dolce v. Dolce, 890 A.2d 361, 364–65 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (concluding that 
emancipation does not occur automatically, by operation of law, simply by reason of the dependent 
child reaching the age of majority); Ross v. Ross, 400 A.2d 1233, 1237 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1979) (concluding that daughter would not be emancipated until she finished her law-school 
education, for which her father was required to pay support). 
 117. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56c(b)(1) (the parents must demonstrate that they “fully 
understand[ ] the consequences of such waiver” before the court will accept a waiver of the right to 
seek educational support on behalf of the child). 
 118. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 28.  In McCarthy v. McCarthy, the son’s continued 
domicile remained with his mother, although he lived in a rented apartment while in college.  633 
N.E.2d 405, 408 n.4 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994). 
 119. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 28.  A child over the age of eighteen but under the age 
of twenty-one may receive extended support regardless of educational enrollment, as long as the 
child is domiciled in the parent’s home and dependent on the parent for maintenance.  Id. 
 120. Johnson v. Louis, 654 N.W.2d 886, 889–91 (Iowa 2002).  The plaintiff challenged the 
differing treatment under equal protection grounds, but the court found a rational basis for the 
classification drawn by the legislature.  Id. at 890.  The court explained that children of unmarried 
parents cannot claim the loss of stability like children whose legally recognized parental relationship 
was taken away from them, and children of married parents enjoy the educational benefit as a quid 
pro quo.  Id. at 891. 
 121. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-115(8)(e) (Supp. 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a)(1) 
(2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.213(3) (West 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-208(4) (2008); 
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agreements are not always enforceable.  Additionally, custodial parents 
may feel constrained to forgo support or to agree to a lower level of 
support for higher education in exchange for custody.122 
A body of case law exists on whether noncustodial parents can 
repudiate written agreements to pay for post-secondary education as 
these agreements get merged into the divorce decree and the court loses 
jurisdiction to award post-minority support.123  For example, in Noble v. 
Fisher,124 the court determined that an agreement by the noncustodial 
father to pay for the children’s college expenses after majority could not 
be enforced as a separate contract action because the agreement was 
merged into the divorce decree and Idaho law did not provide for post-
majority support.125  In addition, in Christiansen v. Christiansen,126 the 
                                                                                                                       
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.510(9) (West 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7(c) (West 2009); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2(2) (2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.86(a)(1)(b) (West 2009); 
H.P.A. v. S.C.A., 704 P.2d 205, 210 (Alaska 1985); Solomon v. Findley, 808 P.2d 294, 295 (Ariz. 
1991); Van Camp v. Van Camp, 969 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Ark. 1998); Kamper v. Waldon, 112 P.2d 1, 
3 (Cal. 1941); Shopa v. DeLaurentis, No. CN91-6188, 1997 WL 878713, at *4 (Del. Fam. Ct. Sept. 
16, 1997); Slaton v. Slaton, 428 So. 2d 347, 348 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Norris v. Norris, 642 
S.E.2d 34, 35 (Ga. 2007); Rosenbloom v. Bauchat, 654 So. 2d 873, 875 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Weiss 
v. Brown, 1997 ME 57, ¶5,691 A.2d 1208, 1210; Corry v. O’Neill, 658 A.2d 1155, 1158 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1995); Holmes v. Holmes, 760 N.W.2d 300, 309 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008); O’Donnell v. 
O’Donnell, 678 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); Zetterman v. Zetterman, 512 N.W.2d 622, 
624–25 (Neb. 1994); Pieper v. Pieper, 368 S.E.2d 422, 424 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988), aff’d, 374 S.E.2d 
275 (N.C. 1988); Larson v. Larson, 2005 ND 67, ¶12, 694 N.W.2d 13, 16–17; Kirtley v. Kirtley, 301 
P.2d 671, 673 (Okla. 1956); Crispo v. Crispo, 909 A.2d 308, 313 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006); Molak v. 
Molak, 639 A.2d 57, 58 (R.I. 1994) (per curiam); Watson-Wojewski v. Wojewski, 2000 SD 132, 
¶43, 617 N.W.2d 666, 674, abrogated on other grounds by Roberts v. Roberts, 2003 SD 75, ¶21, 
666 N.W.2d 477, 483 n.11; Hathaway v. Hathaway, 98 S.W.3d 675, 678 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); 
Elfeldt v. Elfeldt, 730 S.W.2d 657, 658 (Tex. 1987); Morancy v. Morancy, 800 A.2d 435, 437 (Vt. 
2001); Goldin v. Goldin, 538 S.E.2d 326, 330 (Va. Ct. App. 2000); Shortt v. Damron, 649 S.E.2d 
283, 286 (W. Va. 2007); Bliwas v. Bliwas, 178 N.W.2d 35, 37 (Wis. 1970); Witowski v. Roosevelt, 
2009 WY 5, ¶22, 199 P.3d 1072, 1078 (Wyo. 2009).  At least one court has enforced payment under 
a theory of promissory estoppel, even when there was no written agreement by the noncustodial 
parent to provide support.  See Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 8 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2184 (Jan. 18, 
1982). 
 122. See Nancy Polikoff, Custody and Visitation: Their Relationship to Establishing and 
Enforcing Support, in 2 IMPROVING CHILD SUPPORT PRACTICE, III 30 (1985) (alleging that mothers 
accept a bargained-down property settlement or reduced child support award to avoid a custody 
settlement or joint custody arrangement); Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and 
Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615, 645 n.93 (1992) (noting that “[m]any women care more about 
obtaining custody than do men, and might trade away their claims to support and property to insure 
getting their children.”); but see ELEANOR E. MACCOBY AND ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE 
CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 160 (Harv. Univ. Press 1992) (finding no 
empirical evidence that divorce decrees reflect a tradeoff between custody and money issues). 
 123. See generally Annotation, Responsibility of Noncustodial Divorced Parent to Pay for, or 
Contribute to, Costs of Child’s College Education, 99 A.L.R.3d 322 (1980) (analyzing “state and 
federal cases involving the responsibility of a divorced parent who was not given custody over a 
child of the marriage to pay for, or contribute toward, the college education expenses of such child”). 
 124. 894 P.2d 118 (Idaho 1995). 
 125. Id. at 123.  The court would permit the child, as a third party beneficiary to the agreement, 
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New Mexico court refused to enforce a provision in a marital dissolution 
agreement that provided money to the child for college after his majority 
because the trial court had no jurisdiction under New Mexico law to 
award post-secondary support.127 
In Arizona, however, the Arizona Supreme Court overruled a long-
standing line of cases that refused to enforce the parents’ agreement to 
provide higher-education support after the child reached the age of 
majority.  In Solomon v. Findley,128 the court approved the father’s 
agreement to provide educational funds for his daughter through 
completion of college or until she reached the age of twenty-five, 
whichever came first.129  Years later, when the father failed to provide 
educational funds for the child after she reached majority, the mother 
sought to enforce the agreement.130  The divorce court denied her relief 
insisting that it lacked jurisdiction because Arizona does not permit the 
awarding of support beyond the age of eighteen and because their 
agreement was merged into the divorce judgment.131  The Arizona 
Supreme Court disagreed and enforced support past the age of majority 
through a separate contract action.132 
These cases, as well as many others, underscore the changes in 
noncustodial parents’ desires to support their child’s education after 
divorce.  At the time of the divorce—and almost certainly during 
marriage—the noncustodial parent was prepared to pay for college 
expenses.  As time passed and relationships changed, those expectations 
changed to the detriment of the aspiring child.  Using an agreement’s 
status as a contract or as merged into the court order to render it 
unenforceable undermines the content of the document, which 
recognized the parents’ agreement to higher-education support.  The 
ability of litigants to repudiate agreements based on procedural or other 
defenses should not be left to chance.133 
                                                                                                                       
to sue for the unpaid support.  Id. 
 126. 666 P.2d 781 (N.M. 1983), superseded by statute, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7 (West 2003). 
 127. Id. at 783. 
 128. 808 P.2d 294 (Ariz. 1991) (en banc). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 295. 
 132. Id. at 297 (“A contract for child support may be enforced by the divorce court as long as the 
child is a minor.  In this situation, the contract is merged with the divorce decree and enforced by the 
divorce court.  It does not follow, however, that the divorce court may enforce that portion of the 
contract requiring support after the child reaches majority.  In that situation, the parties are left to a 
suit in contract.”). 
 133. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 44,163-CA, p. 4–6 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/09); 1 So. 3d 815, 818–
19 (finding that a clause in a joint implementation order that father was to “begin setting funds 
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IV. ENACT FEDERAL LAW TO ACHIEVE SUPPORT FOR HIGHER 
EDUCATION 
The time has come for the federal government to protect children of 
divorce or of single family households from the loss of higher-education 
support.  Child support laws were intended to provide equality for 
children regardless of the parents’ marital status, but this equality has 
been lost in higher education.  Although historically matters of child 
support were left to the authority of the states, Congress’s presence in the 
field of family law has precedent. 
During the 1970s, Congress was presented with evidence that some 
single-parent households did not have child support awards or, if they 
did, the awards were inadequate or simply unpaid.134  Also concerning to 
Congress was the lack of uniformity, even within a state, on the amount 
of child support awarded.135  As a result, Congress passed legislation to 
require states to have fixed formulas for calculating child support and 
required each state to adopt enforcement mechanisms, such as mandatory 
income withholding and income tax intercepts, to increase collections.136 
The Family Support Act of 1988 provided the most significant 
change in child support awards by mandating that each state establish 
guidelines on which support orders would be based.137  The Advisory 
Panel on Child Support Guidelines explained that the Act was intended 
“to enhance the adequacy of orders . . . by making them more consistent 
with economic evidence on the cost of child rearing.”138  To assist states 
in drafting guidelines, the Panel provided recommendations, including 
that parents should share financial responsibility based on their incomes 
and that children should share in the standard of living of higher-income 
parents.139 
                                                                                                                       
aside” for college expenses was ambiguous as to time and amount and therefore unenforceable). 
 134. See Deborah H. Bell, Child Support Orders: The Federal-State Partnership—Part I, 69 
MISS. L.J. 597, 597–98 (1999).  Congress began regulating child support in the 1930s, but more 
substantial involvement occurred in the 1970s.  Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 651–669 (2006); see also Bell, supra note 134, at 599. 
 137. 42 U.S.C. § 667 (“Each State, as a condition for having its State plan approved under this 
part, must establish guidelines for child support award amounts within the State.  The guidelines 
may be established by law or by judicial or administrative action, and shall be reviewed at least once 
every 4 years to ensure that their application results in the determination of appropriate child support 
award amounts.”). 
 138. LAURA W. MORGAN, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION 
§ 1.02[e] n.30 (comments of Dr. Robert Williams, Chairman of the Advisory Panel on Child Support 
Guidelines). 
 139. Id. § 1.02[d]. 
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In continuing to fulfill the goals of the Family Support Act, Congress 
could act in one of several ways.140  Congress could require states to 
extend support to cover higher education by amending the Family 
Support Act, which provides state guidelines for child support awards.141  
Without supplanting a state’s authority to legislate the specifics of 
higher-education support, Congress could require states, when 
establishing their guidelines, to provide for some level of post-secondary 
support absent any agreement between the parents.  To maintain 
eligibility for federal funds, states would have to demonstrate that 
higher-education support is available past the legal age of majority when 
certain requirements are met.  These requirements would be left to the 
sole discretion of the states.  Congress has consistently placed 
requirements on the states in the area of child support pursuant to its 
spending power,142 and support for higher education would be a natural 
corollary. 
Currently, federal regulations provide that state guidelines must, at a 
minimum, consider all of the earnings and income of the noncustodial 
parent, be based on specific descriptive and numeric criteria, and address 
how the parents will provide for the children’s health-care needs.143  The 
law and regulations could be amended to address payment for the child’s 
post-secondary education.  As has been done by the states that already 
recognize this obligation, each state could allow support based on a more 
liberal or more selective set of criteria.  The specifics would be left to 
each state. 
Allowing Congress to direct higher-education support at the state 
level is justified.  Congress initially required state enforcement of child 
support to repay public funds and to improve the nonsupport of children 
by their absent parents.144  When Congress required states to adopt 
substantive standards for child support, it did so to provide uniformity 
and consistency, and later it encouraged responsible fatherhood and 
motherhood by requiring enhanced enforcement provisions and paternity 
                                                     
 140. I intend to introduce ways in which Congress could affect change in the area of higher-
education support.  The efficacy and preference of Congress’s actions is a topic left for another day. 
 141. See 42 U.S.C. § 666. 
 142. Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States, 18 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 280 (2009) (noting that “[t]here is little question that Congress’s 
extensive involvement in family policy is constitutional under the Spending Clause”) [hereinafter 
Estin, Sharing Governance]; see also Ann Laquer Estin, Federalism and Child Support, 5 VA. J. 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 541, 577–81 (1998) for an excellent discussion of the limitations that do and should 
exist on Congress’s commerce power and spending power on matters of family law. 
 143. 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(c) (2009). 
 144. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1490, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8133, 8145–46. 
0.6.0_WALLACE FINAL 2/24/2010  12:53:06 PM 
686 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
laws.145  Through its Agenda for College Affordability, the White House 
has articulated its goal of making higher education available and 
affordable for more individuals.146  The federal government already 
directs a great deal of the states’ comprehensive child support 
enforcement system, and requiring parental support for children of non-
intact families is another avenue to achieve its goals. 
Recognizing that some may argue that mandatory legislation will 
overstep Congress’s power to regulate in the area of family law,147 
Congress could also pass legislation, as it has done in the paternity 
context, to “encourage” states to adopt laws to extend child support for 
higher education.  In 1988, Congress adopted § 668, volume 42 of the 
United States Code which encourages states to “establish and implement 
a civil procedure for establishing paternity in contested cases.”148  
Although no proverbial carrot and stick exists to entice states to comply, 
this expression of legislative preference may result in more states 
adopting higher-education support. 
As another option, Congress could provide grants to States that 
authorize continued support for higher education.  At this time, Congress 
has authorized grants for states that administer programs to facilitate 
access and visitation to children by their noncustodial parents.149  
Congress could likewise provide grants to state institutions of higher 
learning, if the state authorizes support for higher education even in the 
absence of the parents’ agreement. 
Regardless of Congress’s ultimate path, the terms of educational 
support and its duration should be left to each individual state.  Already, 
several states have articulated considerations and requirements for 
students and parents to follow.  A significant body of case law has 
developed either establishing support or interpreting statutes that 
authorize support.  States can choose to clearly define the parameters of 
higher-education support, which may curtail the judiciary’s involvement 
                                                     
 145. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), 
Pub. L. No. 104-193 § 101(1)–(10), 110 Stat. 2105, 2110–12. 
 146. See “Agenda for College Affordability” discussed infra note 220. 
 147. The author recognizes that when Congress passed the PRWORA, which was intended to 
protect children and increase the self-sustainability of welfare recipients, it was challenged as an 
unconstitutional intrusion into the purely state concern of child support.  See Kansas v. United 
States, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1197 (D. Kan. 1998), aff’d, 214 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2000).  The court 
concluded that Congress can constitutionally condition federal funds on a state enacting a law as 
long as it is in the interest of the general welfare.  Id.; see also Estin, Sharing Governance, supra 
note 142, at 280–81. 
 148. 42 U.S.C. § 668 (2006). 
 149. Id. § 669b. 
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in the family decision-making process.150  At this time, even states that 
permit support only when the parents agree have a wealth of information 
available to them to craft legislation that meets the needs of their 
citizenry. 
Assuming that Congress possesses the proclivity to act, or at least 
study the issue, the question that has yet to be directly addressed is 
whether, from a policy standpoint, parents should be required to support 
their children past the age of majority?  And, if so, should the obligation 
apply only to parents of non-intact families?  The second question 
implicates constitutional concerns of equal protection and will be 
addressed first. 
A. Constitutional Concerns 
The concern articulated by many when considering support for 
higher education stems from the Equal Protection Clause.151  The 
challenge surrounds the inequity in treatment given to children of intact 
families when compared to children of non-intact families.  Because 
children of intact families cannot seek payment for higher education 
from their parents, they are arguably disadvantaged by laws that allow 
children of non-intact families to receive that support. 
The only state in which a parent has successfully challenged a 
higher-education support statute on equal protection grounds is 
Pennsylvania.152  In 1995, in Curtis v. Kline, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court applied a rational basis analysis to find Act 62, which authorized 
courts to order support for college expenses, unconstitutional.153  The 
                                                     
 150. See Jeffrey A. Muriceak, Comment, Pennsylvania’s Legislative Response to Blue v. Blue: 
Adult Children May See Green, But Do Both Parents and Children Have Reasons to Remain Blue?, 
99 DICK. L. REV. 477, 498 (1995) (arguing that a clear delineation of the rights and responsibilities 
of both parent and child will limit litigation in private, family decisions). 
 151. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  The constitutional due process right to privacy, including 
the right to determine support for a child’s education, has been raised by commentators as another 
challenge to higher-education support statutes.  See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 99, at 697–701 
(arguing that such measures infringe on a family’s right to privacy in making important family 
decisions); Cirillo, supra note 10, at 488–95 (same). 
 152. Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 269–70 (Pa. 1995).  In the Florida case of Kern v. Kern, the 
court in dicta questioned whether the law could place on a divorced parent any greater obligation to 
support a child than without the divorce, noting, “such an interpretation may give rise to valid 
constitutional infirmities in that the state would have no reasonable grounds to treat the adult 
children of divorced parents any differently than the adult children of married parents.”  360 So. 2d 
482, 485 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). 
 153. 666 A.2d at 269–70.  Act 62 was passed in response to another case from the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, which held that without statutory authority, courts were not permitted to order 
parents to support their child’s post-secondary education.  Blue v. Blue, 616 A.2d 628, 632 (Pa. 
1992).  The Act specifically provided that “a court may order either or both parents who are 
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court found that the statute classified, without a rational basis, “young 
adults according to the marital status of their parents, establishing for one 
group an action to obtain a benefit enforceable by court order that is not 
available to the other group.”154  The court concluded that this 
classification violated the Equal Protection Clause because no rational 
reason exists to treat the two sets of children differently and the state 
cannot selectively empower only children from non-intact families.155 
The Curtis majority was tempered by a strong dissent, which argued 
that a denial of equal protection would occur if children of broken 
marriages were deprived of the economic support that they would 
normally receive from nuclear families.156  According to the dissent, “[i]f 
the Majority’s view prevails, there is no recourse for these children, who 
will be victimized twice, first by the disruptions, both financial and 
psychological, of their parents’ divorce, and again by the system which is 
theoretically designed to protect them.”157 
Every other state that has considered an equal protection challenge 
has concluded that higher-education support for non-intact families is 
constitutional.158  In Childers v. Childers, the Washington Supreme Court 
overruled an appellate court decision that found no reasonable basis for a 
distinction between divorced and married parents when supporting their 
children beyond the age of majority.159  The court conceded that 
imposing an absolute duty on all divorced parents to provide higher-
education support might be an unreasonable classification, but the state 
was only seeking to minimize the disadvantages that affect children of 
broken homes when the obligation to pay is fair and equitable and will 
not work a significant hardship on the parents.160  In other words, “‘[t]he 
child of divorced parents should be in no worse position than a child 
from an unbroken home whose parents could be expected to supply a 
                                                                                                                       
separated, divorced, unmarried or otherwise subject to an existing support obligation to provide 
equitably for educational costs of their child whether an application for this support is made before 
or after the child has reached 18 years of age.”  23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4327 (1993). 
 154. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 269. 
 155. Id. at 269–70. 
 156. Id. at 272 (Montemuro, J., dissenting). 
 157. Id. at 274. 
 158. See, e.g., Ex parte Bayliss, 550 So. 2d 986, 987 (Ala. 1989); Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 
N.E.2d 1382, 1389–90 (Ill. 1978); Neudecker v. Neudecker, 577 N.E.2d 960, 962 (Ind. 1991); 
Johnson v. Louis, 654 N.W.2d 886, 891 (Iowa 2002); In re Marriage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198, 202 
(Iowa 1980); In re Marriage of Kohring, 999 S.W.2d 228, 232–33 (Mo. 1999); In re Marriage of 
McGinley, 19 P.3d 954, 965 (Or. Ct. App. 2001); Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d 201, 203 (Wash. 
1978) (en banc); see also Cohen, supra note 19, at 196–98 (discussing constitutional challenges to 
higher education support statutes). 
 159. Childers, 575 P.2d at 203. 
 160. Id. at 207. 
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college education.’”161  Because the noncustodial parent will sometimes 
not willingly provide what he or she otherwise would have but for the 
divorce, the state has a compelling interest in protecting that child and 
mitigating the economic disadvantages of divorce.162  Therefore, even if 
the legislation creates a classification, it is supported by a rational 
basis.163 
Although the argument of equal protection continues to be raised, 
without a litigant being able to articulate a suspect class164 or a 
fundamental right,165 the courts are bound to apply rational basis 
analysis.  Because states have a legitimate interest in higher education 
and assisting economically vulnerable children, any equal protection 
challenge would likely fail.166 
B. Policy Concerns 
Without constitutional concerns of equal protection, another concern 
remains: whether it is good policy to require parents of non-intact 
families to pay for, or at least subsidize, their children’s higher 
education?  There is no absolute legal duty for parents to provide a 
                                                     
 161. Id. (quoting Robert M. Washburn, Post-Majority Support: Oh Dad, Poor Dad, 44 TEMP. 
L.Q. 319, 327 (1971)). 
 162. Id. at 208–09. 
 163. Id. at 209. 
 164. In re Marriage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1980) (finding no suspect class); In re 
Marriage of Kohring, 999 S.W.2d 228, 232 (Mo. 1999) (finding no authority that unmarried, 
divorced, or legally separated parents constitute a suspect class); Childers, 575 P.2d at 209 (finding 
no suspect classification). 
 165. Neudecker v. Neudecker, 577 N.E.2d 960, 962 (Ind. 1991) (concluding that fundamental 
child-rearing rights are not infringed because paying expenses for college is like any other support 
payments that are corollary to custody); Vrban, 293 N.W.2d at 201 (finding no fundamental right); 
Kohring, 999 S.W.2d at 232 (finding no fundamental right whether to lend financial support to an 
adult child); Childers, 575 P.2d at 209 (finding no fundamental right not to provide support for 
children over the age of eighteen); see also Atkinson, supra note 99, at 699–700 (concluding that the 
parents’ interest in the level of support for a child’s education would not be found to be a 
fundamental right). 
 166. For a more in-depth discussion of the equal protection jurisprudence in relation to higher-
education support, see Cirillo, supra note 10, at 501 (agreeing with a Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
ruling that a statute requiring divorced parents to pay for their children’s education expenses was 
unconstitutional); Leonard, supra note 70, at 521–26 (discussing equal protection arguments for and 
against mandating divorced parents to pay for post-secondary education); Cohen, supra note 19, at 
201–03 (arguing there is no equal protection violation when noncustodial parents are obligated to 
contribute toward their children’s college education); Hall, supra note 10, at 259–60 (calling for an 
expansion of Iowa’s post-secondary education subsidy to apply to married parents); Dan Huitink, 
Note, Forced Financial Aid: Two Arguments as to Why Iowa’s Law Authorizing Courts to Order 
Divorced Parents to Pay Postsecondary-Education Subsidies is Unconstitutional, 93 IOWA L. REV. 
1423, 1449 (2008) (concluding that Iowa’s post-secondary education subsidy statute is 
unconstitutional). 
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college education to their children.167  Presumably, married parents who 
can afford to pay cannot be forced to pay for a child’s post-secondary 
schooling.  Although one court, in a tax context, has called that principle 
into question,168 most would concede that children are afforded all rights 
and obligations at the moment of emancipation.  One obligation would 
include paying for post-majority or post-emancipation education. 
Professor Judith McMullen, in a 2001 article, argued against 
requiring divorced parents to pay for court-ordered post-majority child 
support because, in her opinion, such a requirement amounts to a form of 
forced heirship.169  “Since parents are almost universally free to 
disinherit their children, parents should be equally free to refuse to pay 
for a college education.”170  Professor McMullen uses John Langbein’s 
thesis on family wealth transmission to support her position.171  She 
argues that if “having one’s education paid for by one’s parents is a form 
of inheritance,” then the same reasons that children can be disinherited 
likewise apply to the payment of educational expenses.172  Specifically, 
Professor McMullen noted that 
a divorced parent may choose not to pay college or other post-majority 
expenses for children of a former marriage because the parent prefers to 
spend the resources in other ways, because of the belief that the 
children have gotten enough support already, because the child’s 
behavior is unacceptable to the parent, or because of a desire to have 
the child become independent.173 
Just as a testator may prefer to spend all of his money, or to leave all his 
property to a surviving spouse rather than to his children, a divorced 
parent may prefer to devote his current resources to a current spouse or 
minor children from a subsequent marriage.174 
This argument raises two problems.  First, there is a fundamental 
policy breakdown when society allows parents to favor children from a 
second marriage over children from the first.  Anecdotally, this Article 
                                                     
 167. See Terrance A. Kline, Note, Clifford Trusts and the Parental Duty to Provide a College 
Education: Braun v. Commissioner, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 537, 553 (1985). 
 168. See Braun v. Comm’r, 48 T.C.M. (P-H) 1116, 1119 (1984) (holding that petitioners, a 
married couple, “clearly . . . retained the obligation to provide their children with a college 
education”); see also Kline, supra note 167, at 540–46 (arguing that the Braun court misread New 
Jersey law when it imposed a duty on married couples to pay for their children’s college education). 
 169. McMullen, supra note 10, at 343–44. 
 170. Id. at 344. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 363. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
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originated during conversations with friends and colleagues who 
lamented about their children’s educational prospects because the 
noncustodial father was refusing to pay for the child’s college education, 
and was not legally obligated to do so, even though he was doing so, or 
planned to do so, for children of the second family.  If a parent is 
supporting minor children from a second family, those expenses may 
affect the parent’s ability to pay, but it should not negate the 
responsibility to that parent’s first children.175 
Second, public policy supports an educated populace,176 and parents 
of non-intact families are less likely to support children than if the family 
were intact.  As noted above, almost ninety percent of children of intact 
families receive full or consistently partial support for college while a 
little less than thirty percent of children from divorced families do.177  
From her countless interviews with children of divorce, Dr. Wallerstein 
notes, “[w]hen they reach their eighteenth birthday, many young adults 
suddenly feel like second class citizens . . . .  Many young people 
consider the cutoff at age eighteen the worst hit of their parents’ 
divorce.”178 
Limiting the obligation of parents to provide higher-education 
support appears to be causally linked to the downward mobility of 
children of divorce.179  More than half of these children end up in lower 
socioeconomic strata than their parents.180  In one interview, Dr. 
Wallerstein spoke to Billy, who was ten years old when his parents 
divorced and twenty years old when he quit college.181  His father had 
not sent the expected tuition check that his mother ultimately paid, but to 
pay for room and board, Billy had to get a job.182  Billy was working 
                                                     
 175. See Atkinson, supra note 99, at 707–08 (noting that the existence of a second family should 
be “a relevant consideration in setting the educational support for” the first family, but should not be 
controlling). 
 176. See In re Marriage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198, 202 (Iowa 1980) (higher education is clearly 
a matter of state interest); In re Marriage of McGinley, 19 P.3d 954, 961 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (there 
is a state interest in having a well-educated populace); Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d 201, 208–09 
(Wash. 1978) (en banc) (one of the most important goals of a democratic society is a well-educated 
population). 
 177. WALLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 335–36 n.6. 
 178. Id. at 248–49. 
 179. Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of Economics, 36 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 1072 (1995) (citing Judith S. Wallerstein & Shauna B. Corbin, Father-
Child Relationships After Divorce: Child Support and Educational Opportunity, 20 FAM. L.Q. 109, 
122–23 (1986)). 
 180. Id. 
 181. WALLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 246–50. 
 182. Id. at 247. 
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nights and going to school and became worried about health problems.183  
He found it hard to keep his grades up with work, and expressed, “if my 
going to college isn’t important to them then it isn’t important to me, 
either.”184  Billy’s father commented in a separate interview that Billy 
was “off and running” and when asked about helping to pay for college, 
he said, “I don’t think it is a good idea.  If Billy chooses to go to college, 
he’ll value it more if he comes up with a way to do it himself.”185  Billy’s 
father and mother were both college educated and both had received 
financial assistance from their families.186 
Parents of intact families make enormous sacrifices to pay for, or at 
least assist in paying for, higher education for their children.187  Children 
from divorced families know that they are disadvantaged after reaching 
the age of majority, but accept it as a consequence of divorce.188  While 
parents of intact families, even unhappy ones, feel pride when their 
children attend college, parents of divorce, due to physical or emotional 
distance, do not enjoy the same emotional connection even though they 
acknowledge their legal obligation, which ends at eighteen.189  “I did all 
that was required” is a consistent theme.190 
The type of legal custodial arrangement—an issue over which the 
child generally has no control—can have significant effects on higher-
education support.191  The findings from a 2000 study of 368 children of 
divorce found that fathers with joint legal custody voluntarily contributed 
more to higher-education support than fathers without.192  As the fathers’ 
access to the children increased, so did their support.193  Parents can feel 
disenfranchised from the child due to physical distance between the 
                                                     
 183. Id. at 247–48. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 248. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 249. 
 188. Id. at 248–49.  Wallerstein notes that “[m]ost universities calculate need based on the 
income of both parents, but if one, often the father who has more money, is unwilling to contribute, 
the young person is denied scholarships.”  Id. at 250; see also Leah duCharme, Note, The Cost of a 
Higher Education: Post-Minority Child Support in North Dakota, 82 N.D. L. REV. 235, 238 (2006) 
(noting that even though the federal government does not consider the noncustodial parent’s income 
in assessing a student’s financial needs, many private colleges do, which can affect an award from 
that particular school). 
 189. WALLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 252–53. 
 190. Id. at 252. 
 191. Fabricius et al., supra note 16, at 236.  When considering what custodial arrangement is in 
the best interest of the child, the reasonable preference of the child can be considered if the child is 
of a sufficient age.  Solangel Maldonado, Beyond Economic Fatherhood: Encouraging Divorced 
Fathers to Parent, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 964–65 n.209 (2005). 
 192. Fabricius et al., supra note 16, at 227, 236. 
 193. Id. at 236. 
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parents’ households or due to emotional scars from the divorce, whether 
involving the child or not.194  The financial consequences on the child, 
even setting aside the emotional effects, are a function of the divorce and 
custodial arrangement, not the child.195 
Even for those noncustodial parents who remain in close contact 
with their children, they view their obligation as a legal one that has a 
termination date.  Ultimately, the custodial parent is left to shoulder the 
burden of higher education for the child.196  In fact, some children even 
seem surprised to learn they have the right to ask for support after the 
legal obligation terminates.197  In line with this expected termination of 
support, a recent study indicates that fewer children of divorce are even 
applying to the nation’s top colleges.198 
In opposition to mandated higher-education support, Professor 
McMullen also argues that parents may desire to spend their money 
elsewhere because their children have received enough support or on the 
belief that their child should be more independent.199  That a child would 
be self-supporting upon the completion of high school, in light of the 
current economic necessity of post-secondary education, is unlikely.  
Although child support generally is tied to emancipation or the age of 
majority, excepting education makes sense.  Parents, during minority, 
may wish to spend their money elsewhere, but with the joy of having 
children comes the obligation of supporting them.200 
                                                     
 194. See id. at 236–37 (describing the reasons that parents might feel disenfranchised). 
 195. See id. (outlining the ways in which the custodial arrangement affects contributions to 
college expenses). 
 196. See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 278 (1985) (stating that the major 
responsibility for older children falls on the custodial mother).  In a study she conducted at Stanford, 
Ms. Weitzman concluded that even though mothers had typically less money than fathers, a larger 
percentage of mothers contributed to the child’s higher-education support.  Id. at 279.  These 
mothers are faced with the “double dilemma” of child support terminating when the child’s expenses 
reach an all-time high.  Id. at 278.  See also Charles F. Willson, Note, But Daddy, Why Can’t I Go 
To College?  The Frightening De-Kline of Support For Children’s Post-Secondary Education, 37 
B.C. L. REV. 1099, 1099–1100 (1996) (recounting a conversation with a custodial mother whose 
successful physician ex-husband would not honor his promise to help support their daughter for 
college). 
 197. See WALLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 253 (recounting a conversation the author had 
with a student who had never thought to ask her father to pay college expenses). 
 198. Id. (citing D. Lillard and J. Gerner, “Getting to the Ivy League: How Family Composition 
Affects College Choice” (paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Population Association of 
America, New Orleans, 1996)). 
 199. McMullen, supra note 10, at 358. 
 200. Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 97 Pa. Super. 303, 308 (1929) (“[P]aternal duty involves, in 
addition to provision for mere physical needs, such instruction and education as may be necessary to 
fit the child reasonably to support itself and to be an element of strength, rather than one of 
weakness, in the social fabric of the state.”). 
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In most cases, the obligation of higher-education support continues 
altruistically for children of intact families, but there is statistical and 
anecdotal evidence that children of divorce are economically 
disadvantaged to their counterparts in intact families after completing 
high school.201  The government need not interfere in the decision-
making process for intact families because society believes parents can 
be trusted to act in the child’s best interest, but when the parent no longer 
lives with the child, this belief may no longer be justified.202  Emotions 
and bitterness replace reason that parents in an intact family generally 
exercise.  Just as the law permits rehabilitative alimony to help educate a 
former spouse to support herself, so too should the law permit 
educational support for children to achieve that self support.203  And, as 
educational expectations of children have progressed, support should 
meet that expectation. 
This Article does not suggest that children should be given a blank 
check for their higher education.  State legislatures and courts, 
recognizing the inequity that could result to parents, have fashioned 
considerations that permit courts to award higher-education support only 
when and to the extent that parents have the financial ability to pay,204 
the child has a need for assistance (even considering federal grant and 
loan assistance),205 and the child has an aptitude for the requested 
education.206  In several states, the obligation terminates in the child’s 
early twenties.207 
An expectation analysis—whether the parents if together would have 
supported the child during college—can buttress a means-needs analysis 
to ensure that a parent’s privacy interest is protected.  If a child’s parents 
discussed during marriage that a child should support himself after high 
school, a court should honor a parent’s decision that self-support by the 
child would be beneficial even if that parent has the objective ability to 
pay.  Similarly, if the standard of living of the family prior to divorce 
included the expectation that the children would get merit-based or need-
                                                     
 201. WALLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 335–36 n.6; WEITZMAN, supra note 196, at 278–79. 
 202. Harris et al., supra note 1, at 710. 
 203. Susan J. Germanio, Note, When College Begins and Child Support Ends: An Analysis of the 
Pennsylvania Legislature’s Response to Blue v. Blue, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 1109, 1149 (1994). 
 204. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 205. See supra note 92, 96 and accompanying text. 
 206. See supra note 94 and accompanying text; see also Rohn v. Thuma, 408 N.E.2d 578, 583 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (in determining whether a father must pay private school tuition when a public 
university was available, the court must weigh the advantages to the child against the increased 
hardship that would be imposed on the father). 
 207. See supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text. 
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based financial aid because the parents could not afford higher education, 
then a court could deny higher-education support. 
An expectation analysis presents a unique challenge when applied to 
unmarried parents, but can be addressed by examining the parents’ 
expectations during the relationship.  For those cohabiting unmarried 
couples, the analysis would not change significantly, but for children 
born outside of a relationship, an expectation analysis might include an 
objective analysis of expectation based on the parents’ station in life.  
Because of the economic and emotional disadvantages of children born 
to unmarried parents and the concomitant value in higher education, 
children of unmarried parents should be treated similarly to children of 
divorce.208 
To address any further concerns about parental authority, additional 
duties and limitations could be statutorily defined.  For example, in some 
states, the child has to remain in good academic standing to receive 
support.209  In one state, the child has to fund at least one-third of his 
education, and the child can only receive an amount based on the price of 
in-state tuition, even if the child wishes to attend an Ivy League 
school.210  Putting limiting measures in place at the behest of each 
individual state could ease concerns of parental autonomy while 
protecting the educational prospects of the child. 
Some have suggested that a reluctance to force parents to pay for 
post-minority education stems not from devaluing education but from a 
concern over family dynamics and the use by parents of positive rewards 
to control their children.211  In other words, parents should not be made 
to pay for a child’s education when that child’s behavior is unacceptable 
or if the child has no relationship or receives no guidance from the 
parents.212  Several courts have dealt with this issue and concluded 
similarly.  For example, in Norris v. Pethe, an Indiana court terminated 
the father’s obligation to pay his daughter’s college expenses because she 
repudiated her relationship with her father.213  The court explained that 
children should not be allowed to compel parents to support their 
                                                     
 208. But see Johnson v. Louis, 654 N.W.2d 886, 889–91 (Iowa 2002) (finding that Iowa’s post-
secondary education subsidy statute that applies to children of divorce, but not children of unmarried 
parents, was constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause). 
 209. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 210. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21F(2)(a), (c) (Supp. 2009). 
 211. Harris et al., supra note 1, at 722. 
 212. See McMullen, supra note 10, at 365 (“[I]f a divorced parent is legally obligated to pay for 
higher education, a child may cut off all contact, reject the parent’s value system, and still collect the 
tuition money.”). 
 213. Norris v. Pethe, 833 N.E.2d 1024, 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 
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educational efforts “unless and until the child demonstrates a minimum 
amount of respect and consideration for that parent.”214  In Norris, the 
daughter rejected attempts by the father to send birthday cards and gifts, 
attend her after-school activities, and participate in counseling.215  The 
court refused to require the father to “stand with outstretched open 
wallet” while the child rejected his attempts to establish a relationship.216  
Children can repudiate parental relationships after reaching the age of 
majority, but they do so with consequence.217  By recognizing reasonable 
expectations that parents place on a child, parental authority can be 
preserved in exchange for parental support, even into majority.218 
Carefully crafted state legislation can capture these concerns of 
parental autonomy.219  Parents may want to terminate support for college 
when a child fails to meet academic standards or refuses to follow 
guidance from or maintain a relationship with a parent.  While 
supporting a child through higher education, parents should also be able 
to support themselves and their new families.  Ultimately, if parents are 
unable to lend financial support for higher education, they should not be 
required to do so.220  Some parents may also share the belief that children 
                                                     
 214. Id. at 1034. 
 215. Id. at 1033–34. 
 216. Id. at 1035. 
 217. See, e.g., Scales v. Scales, 891 N.E.2d 1116, 1119–20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that 
mother was not obligated to pay for children’s college expenses when they repudiated any 
relationship with her); McKay v. McKay, 644 N.E.2d 164, 168 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (father not 
required to pay son’s college expenses when son steadfastly refused to have any relationship with 
father despite ongoing efforts to reconcile); Hambrick v. Prestwood, 382 So. 2d 474, 477 (Miss. 
1980) (father not required to pay for daughter’s college expenses when she had no contact with him 
for at least six years and did not want to have any contact with him). 
 218. Harris et al., supra note 1, at 736 (“Conditioning support on the child’s behaving 
reasonably preserves a connection between the support duty and control, but the control is divided 
between the parent[s] and the court.”). 
 219. In Oregon, parents who are obligated to support their adult children may not condition their 
support on the child’s behavior.  See In re Marriage of Smith, 606 P.2d 694, 696–97 (Or. Ct. App. 
1980) (concluding that a father was required to support his son in college even though the son 
refused to visit him). 
 220. Some have argued that courts should require parents without significant assets or income to 
borrow the funds for higher education because parents of intact families do so and no less should be 
expected of non-intact families.  See, e.g., James G. O’Donohue, Back to School: The Nearly 
Unavoidable Responsibility for College Expenses, 149 N.J. L.J. 745, 745 (1997).  The Obama 
Administration has also proposed initiatives, some of which could assist parents in paying for 
college.  See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Excerpts of the President’s 
Remarks in Warren, Michigan and Fact Sheet on the American Graduation Initiative (July 14, 2009), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Excerpts-of-the-Presidents-remarks-in-Warren-
Michigan-and-fact-sheet-on-the-American-Graduation-Initiative/.  The White House reported that 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 “increased Pell Grants by $500 to $5,350 and 
created the $2,500 American Opportunity Tax Credit for four years of college tuition.”  Id.  As part 
of the “Agenda for College Affordability,” President Obama proposed reforming the student loan 
program, simplifying the student aid application, expanding opportunities for unemployed workers 
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should be required to support themselves through college and no court or 
legislature should order otherwise.  If parents shared this sentiment while 
together, then courts should be able to consider that belief and even if the 
parents can pay, deny the request for support.  Current state laws so 
provide. 
Support awards for higher education may not resemble the child 
support guidelines currently in place.  Formulaic guidelines would likely 
be too rigid for the fact intensive approach that states may desire.  For 
example, although non-custodial parents are generally required to pay the 
custodial parent his or her share of child support, both parents, if the 
child is living away, might be required to furnish support.  Because 
support could include direct educational expenses or living expenses or 
both, to whom and by whom support is paid may differ. 
Because laws can be drafted to provide higher-education support 
without sacrificing parental autonomy and because states over the past 
forty years have proven their efficacy, the worst action would be 
inaction.  Undoubtedly, there is a financial divide between children of 
intact families and children of non-intact families when facing the costs 
of higher education.  Knowing that this gap exists and that considerations 
can deflect concerns about parental involvement, Congress should focus 
on mandating or at the least encouraging support for higher education. 
Other alternatives have been suggested and, in some states, have 
been implemented to increase higher-education support for children.  In 
Louisiana, during a child’s minority, a court can award a portion of child 
support to be placed in trust for the educational needs of the child.221  
The trust must contain maximum spendthrift restraints, which protects 
the funds from creditors, and must terminate when the child turns 
twenty-four, unless the parents agree to a later date.222  Likewise, in 
Tennessee, the court can award an amount above that needed for basic 
support to be placed in an educational trust for college.223  When the 
resources of a noncustodial parent can provide the necessary funds 
without hardship to that parent, the Tennessee courts reason that 
establishing an educational trust for college during the child’s minority is 
a proper element of child support.224  Professor McMullen has also  
 
                                                                                                                       
to attend community college, expanding the Perkins loan program, and investigating improvements 
to state 529 plans.  Id. 
 221. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.13(B)(2) (2008). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Nash v. Mulle, 846 S.W.2d 803, 806–07 (Tenn. 1993). 
 224. Id. 
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suggested offering tax or other incentives to parents who provide higher-
education support for their children.225 
While these alternatives are viable solutions, congressional action is 
preferable.  Educational trusts during minority fail to include children 
who are in college at the time of divorce and may be reserved for high-
income cases only.  Immediate tax or other incentives may cause some 
parents to provide higher-education support, but tax incentives already 
exist for parents saving in advance for college, most notably the state 529 
plans.226 
V. CONCLUSION 
Children across this country become self-supporting, but they do so 
gradually.  Support for children in intact families can taper down as they 
reach factual independence, while support for children of divorce or 
unmarried parents abruptly ends at the age of legal majority, even though 
factual independence generally follows.  Parents should pay for higher 
education when they have the means to pay and the child is seeking 
support because they wish to further their education.  When making the 
choice to have a child, resulting responsibilities are necessarily imposed.  
“[T]he privilege of parenthood carries with it the duty to assure a 
necessary education.”227  Today, “necessary education” has taken on new 
meaning. 
Congress can effect considerable change in higher-education 
support.  During the last forty years, some states have protected children 
from the economic disadvantage of their parents’ marital status by 
permitting support to extend to higher education.  Even in the wake of 
Curtis v. Kline, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down a 
higher education support statute based on equal protection, other states 
                                                     
 225. McMullen, supra note 10, at 368. 
 226. A 529 plan, legally known as a “qualified tuition plan,” is “a tax-advantaged savings plan 
designed to encourage saving for future college costs.”  U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
An Introduction to 529 Plans, Aug. 6, 2007, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/intro529.htm.  “There 
are two types of 529 plans: pre-paid tuition plans and college savings plans.”  Id.  “All fifty states 
and the District of Columbia sponsor at least one type of 529 plan.”  Id.  “Pre-paid tuition plans 
generally allow college savers to purchase units or credits at participating colleges and universities 
for future tuition and, in some cases, room and board,” while college savings plans “generally permit 
a college saver . . . to establish an account for a student,” with several investment options for his or 
her contributions, for the purpose of paying the student’s eligible college expenses.  Id.  “Investing 
in a 529 plan may offer college savers special tax benefits;” for example, “[e]arnings in 529 plans 
are not subject to federal tax, and in most cases, state tax,” so long as withdrawals are used for 
eligible college expenses, such as tuition and room and board.  Id. 
 227. Newburgh v. Arrigo, 443 A.2d 1031, 1038 (N.J. 1982). 
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have passed legislation to protect children and confirmed their 
constitutionality.228  There has been no trend to retreat from higher-
education support, but currently only sixteen states permit such support. 
With knowledge that children of divorce or unmarried parents are 
emotionally and economically disadvantaged in attending a post-
secondary institution, lawmakers have and should continue to intervene 
to redress this inequity.  Statutes can be drafted to mitigate concerns of 
parental authority and autonomy and children can receive the support 
that, but for their parents’ marital status, would have been forthcoming. 
 
                                                     
 228. 666 A.2d 265, 270 (Pa. 1995). 
